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Introduction
This paper examines reforms which move income tax settings towards an optimal structure, where the latter is defined in terms of the maximisation of a social welfare function, defined over either money metric utility or net income. A key objective is to consider the implications of adopting particular value judgements, rather than seeking to make specific policy recommendations. The aim is to examine the optimal direction of changes to the parameters of an existing income tax-transfer system, rather than the properties of an optimal structure. It is argued that helpful practical policy advice regarding the effects of tax changes can be based on a behavioural microsimulation model in which a high degree of population heterogeneity is represented along with all the details of complex tax and transfer systems, rather than using the simple stylised forms of standard optimal tax models. 1 Hence, while solving for an optimal tax and transfer system in a microsimulation model is generally impractical, it is possible to identify small changes which can be described as welfare-improving. 2 The context considered here is the New Zealand income tax structure, and the analysis is carried out using the Treasury's behavioural microsimulation model, TaxWell-B. The approach initially examines small changes in individual marginal tax rates and income thresholds in the income tax schedule, allowing changes that are both revenue neutral and welfare improving to be explored, and highlighting the role of value judgements. This involves the computation of social welfare changes per dollar of revenue, for changes in each existing marginal income tax rate, using explicit forms of the social welfare function. The analysis is then extended in two main directions. First, the range of possible tax reforms considers welfare-improving combinations of tax rate and threshold changes. Second, insights from the literature on the elasticity of taxable income are used to examine the effect of addi- 1 The optimal tax models may be divided into two types, referred to as structural and reduced form approaches. The former includes the long line of analyses starting from Mirrlees (1971) , where the government is considered to maximise an explicit welfare function, allowing for a government budget constraint, and individuals maximise utility functions specified in terms of net income and leisure. The reduced form approach relies on few parameters, with a central role given to the the elasticity of taxable income and an optimality condition expressed in terms of marginal benefits and costs of a tax change; see, for example, Saez (2001) , Kleven et al. (2009) , Pickety and Saez (2013) Pickety et al. (2014) , and for an application to New Zealand, see Creedy (2015) . 2 On microsimulation modelling, see Creedy and Kalb (2005, 2006) . Examples are in Decoster and Haan (2015) , Dagsvik et al. (2014) , Thoresen (2004) Thoresen and Vattø (2015) . Capéau et al. (2016) provide a detailed discussion of Australian and European tax microsimulation models. When using such models it is nevertheless important to be aware of their limitations. In particular, they deal only with the supply side of the labour market and, despite modelling labour supply, have no genuine dynamic element. Furthermore, they deal only with financial incentive effects rather than administrative behaviour and monitoring features designed to reduce moral hazard. tional income responses, other than those driven by labour supply changes. These results show that there is much scope for marginal tax reforms in New Zealand that are for both revenue neutral and welfare improving, depending on the distributional value judgements adopted.
Examining the direction of welfare-improving reforms in Australia using, the MITTS behavioural microsimulation model, Creedy and Hérault (2012) report that, for a range of social welfare modelling assumptions, an optimal marginal reform involves a reduction in the top marginal rate, which was around 47 percent (in 2003/04). Unlike Australia and most other OECD countries, New Zealand has a relatively low top marginal income tax rate, of 33 percent since 2009-10. There is no tax-free zone and few deductions are allowed, so that the tax base is relatively broad. The income tax is combined with an array of social transfers with abatement rates generating a wide range of effective marginal tax rates for low-to-middle income earners. 3 This makes New Zealand an especially interesting context in which to examine the optimal direction of tax reform using a microsimulation model. It is of interest to consider whether optimal reform in New Zealand is similar to Australia in generally supporting less marginal rate progression (a flattening of the rate structure), or whether New Zealand's relatively low top rate implies marginal reforms producing more rate progression. The microsimulation methods used are discussed in Section 2. This is complicated by the existence of highly nonlinear budget constraints facing individuals, which affect the computation of welfare changes and also leads to an asymmetry in the effects of tax rate increases and decreases. Section 3 presents aggregate results relating to reforms to the New Zealand income tax structure. Changes to the income tax rates are examined in Section 4, while changes to income thresholds, as well as combined tax rate and threshold changes, are discussed in Section 5. Brief conclusions are in section 6.
Computation of the Welfare Metric
An important modelling requirement is to specify a suitable welfare metric and social welfare function. In the basic optimal tax model, this is straightforward given the choice of cardinalisation of utility, where there are common preferences and homothetic utility functions are usually used. 4 The conditions required for welfare functions to possess basic properties turn out to be highly restrictive: see, for example, Donaldson (1992) and Blackorby, Laisney and Schmachtenberg (1993). 5 Further complications are raised by differences between individuals in their preference for leisure: it is known that with preference heterogeneity, standard welfare functions based on money metric utility can violate certain conditions, such as the principle of transfers. One approach was suggested by Aaberge and Colombino (2008) and Ericson and Flood (2009) , who used a discrete hours structural approach to model labour supply, allowing for a substantial amount of population heterogeneity. However, the welfare metric used in their social welfare function is a value of utility based on an independently estimated utility function, which is considered to be the same for all individuals. 6 While recognising the potential difficulty, the approach used here is to retain preference heterogeneity when producing money metric utility. Starting from the actual tax structure, and considering small changes in a range of tax parameters, a microsimulation model is used to obtain values of welfare and revenue changes, denoted ∆ and ∆ respectively, for each tax parameter in turn. The direction of an optimal reform is indicated by relative orders of magnitude of these ratios. Computation of money metric utility for each individual, in a discrete hours context, follows that proposed by Creedy and Kalb (2005) , and implemented and extended to the calculation of money metric utility in the presence of a random utility component, by Creedy, Hérault and Kalb (2011). The behavioural simulations produce a frequency distribution of post-reform hours for each individual, conditional on the individual's optimal pre-reform hours being equal to observed discretised hours. Similarly a frequency distribution of welfare and net income changes is obtained for each individual. The approach has the advantage of ensuring consistency between the welfare evaluations and the estimated labour supply responses.
Value judgements concern three aspects: the welfare metric, the form of the social welfare function to be used and the definition of the unit of analysis. As mentioned above, money metric utility is used here as the welfare metric, but is also compared with the use of a metric based on net income. The choice of welfare function is closely related to value judgements regarding inequality, and different values of inequality aversion are used in the analyses in this paper. Any evaluation for a broad group of income units involves comparisons of units of different size and composition. The reported results are based on the use of money metric of the basic utilitarian form, allowing for inequality aversion. The welfare metric is thus utility, which is necessarily considered to be cardinal and interpersonally comparable. 5 Even a minimum requirement of homotheticity is not satisfied by the types of direct utility function used in practical labour supply analyses. This has led to the adoption of non-welfarist approaches, such as that proposed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1999) . 6 Blundell and Shephard (2009) simply adopt a social welfare function based on a common (isoelastic) utility transformation. utility per adult equivalent, using parametric equivalence scales described below.
The steps in the social evaluation are as follows. For each income unit, the initial money metric utility,  0 , is obtained, using pre-reform taxes as 'reference prices'. This is equal to 'full income' under the pre-reform system, defined as the net income which could be obtained if all the endowment of time were devoted to work at the going wage rate. For each income unit, the net income at 80 hours of work (the assumed maximum number per week) by all adult members of the income unit under pre-reform taxes is calculated, giving full income for the income unit. Following the approach introduced by Creedy, Hérault and Kalb (2011), the equivalent variation from a tax policy change,  , is obtained by searching all discrete labour supply points for the minimum value for each conditional draw, while taking into account the non-linearity and non-convexity of the budget constraint. Then, given the equivalent variation resulting from the reform for each of the discrete hours levels, money metric utility is computed as  1 =  0 −  . A probability distribution of  s and thus money metric utilities is obtained for each unit.
For each income unit, the adult equivalent size, , is obtained, following Banks and Johnson (1994) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994) , using the following parametric scales:
where   and   are respectively the number of adults and children in the unit,  is the weight attached to children and  represents the extent of economies of scale. The size of each unit, ,   , is used to compute money metric utility per adult equivalent person,   . The distributions of pre-reform and post-reform money metric utility can be used to calculate social welfare measures.
In computing inequality and welfare measures with the individual as the unit of analysis, each value of   is weighted by the actual number of persons in the income unit,   . This paper uses Atkinson's inequality measure, (), where  is the degree of relative inequality aversion. The inequality measure is the proportional difference between the arithmetic mean,, and the equally distributed equivalent value,   , where the latter is the value which, if obtained by everyone, gives the same social welfare as the actual distribution; hence () = 1 −   . Using an additive welfare function based on constant relative inequality aversion, , of the form:
the equally distributed equivalent value,   , is in general, for a set of values   , for  = 1     , equal to:
Results can be obtained for a range of inequality aversion parameters, . Finally, social welfare in each system is most conveniently obtained using the abbreviated form of the welfare function in (2), given by:
where is the arithmetic mean value of the money metric utility per adult equivalent. The use of the abbreviated form, showing the trade-off between 'equity and efficiency', is convenient because it ensures that  is positive for all values of . In view of the discrete hours approach to labour supply used here, the summary measures of the various distributions are evaluated using the 'pseudo distribution' approach of Creedy, Kalb and Scutella (2006) . This provides more accurate results than taking, say, the arithmetic mean values for each person. The important question arises of what range of values should be considered when examining the sensitivity of results to . In the analysis below, results are reported for values ranging from 0.1 to 1.4. These orders of magnitude can be interpreted by considering the 'leaky bucket' experiment of making a transfer from a richer to a poorer person. A transfer from person 2 to person 1, in the context of incomes,  2   1 , which leaves social welfare unchanged is given by:
Hence if, for discrete changes and a transfer of 1 from the richest person, ∆ 2 = −1, and if incomes are such that  2 = 2 1 , then the amount which must be given to the poorest person is
For example, if  = 01, a leak of 7 cents is tolerated from the dollar taken from person 2, so that person 1 receives 93 cents. For  = 02, the leak increases to 13 cents. Where  = 05, ∆ 1 = 071 and a leak of 29 cents from the dollar is tolerated. A value of  of 14 may thus be considered extremely high, since ∆ 1 = 039 and the judge is prepared to lose 61 cents from the dollar. The tolerance for leaks clearly depends on the assumed ratio of incomes of transferor and transferee. For example, if  2  1 = 3, then when  = 01, ∆ 1 = 090 and a leak of 10 cents is tolerated, and if  = 02, ∆ 1 = 080 and the maximum 7 On abbreviated forms see, for example, Lambert (1993) . leak tolerated is 20 cents. 8 The following simulation results are based on the New Zealand tax and transfer system for the financial year of 2011/12. Population values were obtained by using the sample weights. The income tax structure is given in Table 1 , where   is the marginal rate applied above an annual income of   , for  = 1  4. Consider taking $1 from someone in the top tax bracket with $100k, and making a transfer to someone in the bottom tax bracket with $10k, so that  2  1 = 10, For values of  of 0.1, 0.2, 0.8 and 1.4, the leaks that would be tolerated are respectively 20, 37, 84 and 96 cents. The higher value of  therefore approaches 'extreme' inequality aversion, where the 'judge' is willing simply to confiscate income from the richest person. 9 If the $1 taken from the person with $100k is used to make a transfer to someone in the second tax bracket with, say, $25k, the leaks tolerated for the same set of s are respectively 13, 24, 67 and 86 cents. In this case the richest person is paying a marginal tax rate that is almost double that faced by the person in the second tax bracket. A distinguishing feature of the New Zealand income tax is that there is no tax-free income range, so that the first rate of 10.5 per cent applies from the first dollar, although various rebates also apply. The marginal income tax rates, particularly in the lower-income ranges, do not reflect effective marginal tax rates in view of the existence of a range of means-tested benefits with various taper or abatement rates. The present approach can also be used to examine small changes in benefit levels and associated abatement rates though that is not pursued here. 
The simulations reported are for small tax changes, such that each of the marginal rates was in turn decreased by one percentage point, and then increased by one percentage point, and the resulting changes in total revenue and social welfare were obtained. The use of small changes means that the labour supply adjustments are expected to be quite small, given the use of a discrete hours approach. 8 Some surveys have found an average inequality aversion in the context of the Atkinson inequality measure of about 0.2; see Amiel, Creedy and Hurn (1999). 9 Indeed, with  = 3, the leak tolerated is 99.9 cents, virtually the whole of the $1 taken from person 2. Tables 2 and 3 present summary information about aggregate effects for, respectively, increases in each marginal tax rate by one percentage point, and increases in thresholds by $1000. The effects of reductions in marginal rates and thresholds are shown in Appendix B, in Tables 12 and 13 . These are obtained by adding all expected  and net incomes across all income units without equivalising the amounts. All monetary values are in $million per year. Values in the tables are given to two decimal places, but in computing all changes, more decimal places were of course used. The threshold changes are for  2 ,  3 and  4 only, as  1 = 0. Changes in net government revenue account both for changes in income tax revenue and for consequent changes in expenditures on social security. Indeed, government spending on pensions, allowances and rebates is affected by changes in income taxes and labour supply. The tables also presents labour supply responses by demographic group. For couples, the first amount relates to the male partner while the second amount is for the female partner.
Aggregate Effects
Following the convention used in the public finance literature, equivalent variations, and hence marginal welfare costs, are defined such that they are positive for tax increases and welfare losses. Hence, in Table 3 , for threshold increases, tax revenue and equivalent variations are negative, indicating welfare gains: hence the marginal welfare costs are negative. 10 In the case of sole parents, there are several tax changes where the excess burden concept is not appropriate: these arise where the change in revenue in absolute terms is less than the change in welfare (measured by the  ). These cases arise for an increase in  4 , a reduction in  1 , an increase in  2 and a reduction in  4 , and reflect the large labour supply responses; hence in the case of the tax increase, revenue rises by a relatively small amount.
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Increases in marginal tax rates have the expected negative effects on labour supply, although changes in  4 have the smallest labour supply effects for all groups. Labour supply responses more broadly are relatively small except for sole parents, a result consistent with the findings of Creedy and Mok (2017). Table 3 (and 13 in Appendix B) shows that these small labour supply effects are nevertheless associated with substantial marginal welfare costs, ranging from around 7 to 14 per cent for the various 1 percentage point or $1,000 tax reforms considered. This serves to highlights the empirical importance here of the known theoretical result that small observed net labour supply effects on average are consistent with substantial marginal excess burdens associated with tax changes.
The tables also allow evaluation of the effects on welfare of tax-induced changes in 10 Similarly for Table 13 in Appendix B, which relates to marginal rate reductions. 11 This kind of situation is discussed further in the New Zealand context by Creedy and Mok (2018). It is clear that changes in welfare and net income resulting from the small tax rate and threshold reforms considered can be quite different; these differences again ranging from around 7 to 14 per cent. For example, an increase in  3 is associated with a 12.72 per cent smaller welfare reduction compared to the fall in aggregate net incomes. The equivalent value for a reduction in  3 is a 7.95 per cent smaller increase in welfare. Overall however, increases and decreases in tax rates have fairly symmetric effects on aggregate welfare and average hours worked. The effects on net revenue of allowing for labour supply responses are shown by the differences between the first and second rows of each block of the tables. These can be quite substantial, with this 'behavioural effect' on total revenue ranging from 5 to 13 per cent of the estimated 'mechanical effect', which holds labour supply fixed. Table 4 summarises these behavioural revenue responses in total and across population sub-groups. The values shown are the log-differences in the revenues given in Tables 2 and 3, and Tables 12 and 13  of Appendix B. For example, the decrease in total revenue due to labour supply responses to an increase in the 1st tax rate is equivalent to (minus) 10.8 per cent of the mechanical revenue increase. Revenue effects are largest for increases in  2 both in absolute amounts and in terms of percentage behavioural effects, shown in Table 4 . Behavioural responses are also relatively large for decreases in the 3rd tax threshold, suggesting that the responsiveness of the relatively dense part of the income distribution facing  2 below the $48,000 threshold is especially important overall.
The contribution of the four household types to the behavioural revenue responses can also be seen to vary considerably, though the values for sole parents should be treated with caution since they are based on less than 10 per cent of total sample households and a much smaller fraction of total revenue changes. Nevertheless, it is clear that one of the consequences of the larger labour supply responses generally observed for single women is that their behavioural revenue responses are also relatively high, compared for example with those of single men. Table 5 shows the resulting absolute values of the changes in welfare per dollar of revenue, |∆∆|, for increases and decreases in each marginal tax rate by one percentage point. Results are shown using money metric utility and net income, for two values of the economies of scale parameter, , in the parametric adult equivalence scales, and three values of inequality aversion, . The weight attached to children, , was set at 06. In considering these values of |∆∆|, it should be recognised that the revenue responses to tax changes arise only from labour supply changes. In practice, reported taxable income changes may be larger because of a range of other possible responses involving income shifting and under-reporting. 12 These effects are considered in sub-section 4.4.
Changes to Marginal Tax Rates

Changes in Welfare per Dollar of Revenue
The table indicates that marginal welfare gains and losses per dollar of revenue are not symmetric. Given  and , the welfare gain per dollar of revenue associated with a decrease in  1 to  3 are always smaller than the corresponding welfare loss associated with a tax increase. The opposite result is found for  4 , with welfare gains from a tax rate reductions always larger than the welfare losses from tax rate increase. The results shown above, in Tables 2 
Money metric utility Scale parameter:  = 08 Welfare changes per dollar for reductions and increases in tax rates indicate the direction of welfare-increasing changes to the tax system. In the simple case where it is required to obtain a small increase in revenue by adjusting one rate, the appropriate strategy is to increase that marginal rate resulting in the smallest welfare cost. Conversely, for a small reduction in revenue, a reduction is made in the tax rate associated with the largest welfare gain.
However, it is important to examine adjustments to the tax system that keep total tax revenue unchanged, by combining an increase in a tax rate to fund a decrease in another tax rate. Such adjustments are of particular interest because they contribute to a movement towards an optimal tax system, at no cost for the government. The optimal change keeping total tax revenue unchanged is the one involving an increase in the tax rate with the lowest welfare cost per extra dollar of revenue combined with a decrease in the tax rate with the highest welfare gain per dollar of reduced revenue.
14 These are effectively revenue neutral changes, since they both consider changes per dollar of revenue.
In the case of money metric utility, consider the welfare gains and losses for the lowest inequality aversion parameter of  = 01, along with the use of  = 08 for the scale economy parameter in the adult equivalence scales. This suggests that a revenue neutral reform that increases the social welfare function could be achieved by raising  4 and reducing  2 . For aversion parameters of  = 02 and higher, the results suggest raising  4 while simultaneously lowering  1 . These results are modified slightly with  = 04. In this case the rise in the top marginal rate is accompanied by lowering  1 for values of  = 08 and higher. These results contrast with those obtained for Australia, reported by Creedy and Hérault (2011), which generally suggested that a flattening of the rate structure would increase the social welfare function. The Australian income tax displays considerably more rate progression than in New Zealand, including a much higher top marginal rate of 047 (in the Creedy and Hérault study). 15 In the case of net income as the welfare metric, consider the case where  = 01, and  = 08. Here, the largest changes in welfare per dollar of revenue are associated with upward and downward movements in  4 . In cases where the same rate is associated with, say, both the lowest |∆∆| for a rate increase and the highest |∆∆| for a rate reduction, the rule used above is insufficient. It is appropriate to use a more general rule that the welfare-improving revenue-neutral change to the tax system is the one involving the largest difference between the welfare cost of the tax increase and the welfare gain of the tax decrease. In this case the optimal marginal change involves an increase in  4 combined with a reduction in  2 . The same result follows for  = 02, but for  = 08 and higher, the largest gain per dollar from a rate reduction is for  1 .
If the evaluation function reflects a complete absence of inequality aversion,  = 0, and the value of the abbreviated welfare function is simply the arithmetic mean money metric utility (or net income) per adult equivalent person. Setting  = 0, it is found in all cases (that is, for both money metric utility and net income, and for the two values of  considered) that an optimal marginal reform involves a flattening of the tax rate structure. Hence, the optimal change is to lower the top marginal rate and raise the bottom rate. Hence, a small degree of aversion is sufficient to change the optimal policy substantially. 16 It is important to stress that the results refer only to 'small' changes in tax rates and the direction of change; they can give no indication of the extent to which rates should be changed. Furthermore, it would not be appropriate to carry out simulations for larger tax rate changes. It would be possible for a large change in a marginal tax rate to move into the range where total revenue is decreasing, but where the change in revenue is nevertheless positive. That is, the movement could be from a point on the revenue-increasing side of the Laffer curve to a point on the revenue-reducing side, with an increase in total revenue arising from the large discrete change in the rate. It is then possible for the results to indicate, wrongly, that a further increase in the tax rate would be optimal.
Inequality Changes
The top panel of Table 6 reports percentage changes in Atkinson inequality measures of money metric utility and net income for increases and decreases in the marginal income tax rates. In the case of money metric utility, pre-reform value of the Atkinson index are 00224, 00498, 02355 and 03276 for  = 01, 02, 08, and 14 respectively. the corresponding values for net income are 00115, 00324, 01863 and 02298. The table shows that inequality changes are approximately symmetric for tax rate increases and decreases.
In considering inequality changes, lowering  1 gives the largest percentage reduction in inequality while, for rate increases, raising  4 gives the largest percentage reduction. The introduction of more rate progression therefore unambiguously reduces the inequality of money metric utility. However the size of the inequality changes in Table 6 are very small in all cases. For example, the largest change is just over one-quarter of one per cent, for an increase in  1 ( = 14;  = 08). This partly reflects the small size of the reform simulation.
Evaluation of the inequality effects of income tax reforms in practice is more often evaluated conducted in term of pre-and post-reform net incomes. It is therefore interesting to compare inequality reform outcomes for money metric utility with those based on net incomes in the lower panel of the table. As with money metric utility, these are generally symmetric between tax rate increases and decreases and similar for  = 08 and  = 04. Consider, for example, outcomes for the case of the one percentage point increase in the top marginal rate,  4 , for the alternative values of  and . This reveals that the apparent reductions in inequality (at all values of  and ) when using net income as a basis for measurement are up to six times greater than when these are based on money metric utility. This is to be expected since any reductions in market incomes, associated with reduced labour supply resulting from the tax increase, exaggerate the decline when leisure or home production are suitably valued. However, it serves to highlight that commonly quoted income-based inequality statistics may be quite inaccurate as a measure of the inequality impact of tax reforms on a broader measure of utility.
A similar difference can be seen to apply to the measured inequality impacts of changes in  2 and  3 , while the metric used makes little difference to inequality changes resulting from changes in  1 . This latter result would suggest that the main inequality impact of changes in the marginal tax rate applicable below $14,000 is not primarily related to labour supply decisions and resulting net income/leisure substitutions. This is perhaps less surprising when it is recognised that, for many such very low income taxpayers,  1 (= 0105) is very different from applicable effective average and marginal rates given the array of benefits and abatement rates at such low income levels.
Welfare Changes and Simultaneous Changes in Two Tax Rates
Further insight can be obtained by examining the effects of specific combinations of changes in tax rates which maintain constant revenue. Thus, consider the case where rates   and   are changed together in opposite directions. The specific changes in rates for a revenueneutral change involving an increase in   and a reduction in   can be obtained using:
When rate, , is increased and rate, , is reduced to keep total revenue unchanged, the resulting welfare increase from such a revenue-neutral change is: for increases and decreases of one percentage point in each tax rate.
The top section of Table 8 shows the values of
is combined with a decrease in  2 , then
=2.932. Finally, the lower section of Table 8 reports the resulting welfare changes from the various combinations. Clearly, the greatest welfare increase is for an increase in  4 combined with a reduction in  1 , corresponding to the result found from Table 5 . 
Additional Income Responses
The extensive literature on the concept of the elasticity of taxable income, ETI, suggests that, in addition to labour supply responses, there may be other taxable income and hence revenue responses to marginal tax rate changes. 17 In some situations it could be possible for some taxable income to be shifted to other, lower-taxed, income sources or simply concealed from the tax authorities. To the extent that such responses do not involve real-resource losses, the main effect relates to revenue rather than welfare changes. This subsection considers whether the results reported above, concerning in particular the top marginal income tax rate, are modified by allowing for an elasticity of taxable income that exceeds responses arising from labour supply changes.
Consider the top tax rate only, and let denote average taxable income of the  individuals above the income threshold, . The total revenue obtained from the top marginal rate is thus:
Define  = ( − ) , so that (8) can be rewritten as  =  and the change in tax revenue arising from a change in  is, supposing that it does not involve individuals moving to a lower tax bracket:
The first term in (9) is the 'mechanical component',  = , arising from the effect of changing  with an unchanged taxable income, and the second term,  = , is the 'behavioural component' arising from the endogenous income change. 18 The mechanical component can be obtained from TaxWell simply by holding labour supplies fixed. For the top marginal rate increase, this is reported in the lowest block of Table 2 , so that  = 17245. The same table gives the total change, allowing for labour supply variations, as 16089: hence the behavioural component from labour supply responses alone is given by the difference, 16089 − 17245 = −1156. Consider the relevant changes, when starting from the concept of the elasticity of taxable income, defined in terms of the net-of-tax rate, 1 − , so that values of  are expected to be positive. By definition:
since  = , on the assumption, mentioned above, that individuals do not move to a lower tax bracket, so that  and  are constant in (8) . Hence re-arranging gives:
Hence  =  can be written as:
An estimate of the aggregate behavioural change can therefore be obtained for a given value of the elasticity,  1− , and information about the total income of those in the top tax bracket. First, IRD data for 2011/2012 shows that a suitable value for , the income of those falling into the top bracket, is $50 950 million. Hence, with  = 033 and  = 001, substitution in (12) gives:
The elasticity of taxable income has been notoriously difficult to estimate with precision, but illustrative results can be used to show the sensitivity of the above results to different assumptions about the elasticity. 19 First, consider the elasticity of taxable income that is consistent with labour supply changes being the only form of response in the top tax bracket. Setting  from (13) equal to the behavioural response of −1156 reported above for labour supply changes, gives a value of  1− equal to 115625475 = 00454. Thus a change in which labour supply adjustments give a (negative) behavioural component of about 7 per cent of the mechanical component implies an elasticity of taxable income of only 0.0454. If, instead, the elasticity of taxable income of those in the top bracket is equal to 0.2, the welfare change associated with a revenue neutral increase in the top rate combined with a reduction in the bottom tax rate falls from 30.391 (as in Table 8 for  = 02) to 22952: this remains the reform giving the largest increase in the social welfare function. A much higher elasticity of taxable income of 0.5 continues to give the biggest gain (though substantially lower at 8515) to this marginal reform: this elasticity implies that the behavioural component of the tax change is 74 per cent of the mechanical component.
For  1− = 06 the behavioural component increases to 89 per cent of the mechanical component, suggesting that the top bracket is almost at the peak of the Laffer curve, and resulting in a welfare gain from an increase in the top rate of 3.703. This compares with the gain of 6539 from raising the penultimate marginal rate, and lowering the bottom rate, but only if such a rise does not itself lead to strong behavioural changes in addition to labour supply responses.
In summary, it is often recognised that, among higher income earners or top rate income taxpayers, the primary responses to tax rate changes generally do not take the form of changes in hours worked. Rather they may be reflected in harder-to-measure work effort, income shifting between tax codes, tax evasion etc. The results in this sub-section confirm that the TaxWell generates a relatively low and plausible elasticity of taxable income (around 005) as expected, when only labour supply (hours or participation) adjustments are modelled. However, other behavioural responses would have to be relatively large for the TaxWell-generated optimal direction of reform of the top tax rate to be reversed. Some estimates of that elasticity nevertheless suggest it could be quite large, at least as observed in association with the major income tax reform in 2001; see Carey et al. (2015) .
Changes to Income Thresholds
The previous discussion has concentrated on adjustments to income tax rates. However, it is of interest to consider the effects of changes in income thresholds. Clearly, any change in tax thresholds which do not move an individual into a different tax bracket do not affect the marginal rate faced, but there is a change in net income if the threshold is below gross income (since a portion of lower income is taxed at a different rate). Individuals who are moved across thresholds experience changes in both marginal and average rates (at the pre-change gross income level). This section considers the welfare and inequality effects of threshold changes, along with the combination of rate and threshold changes. Table 9 presents absolute values of marginal welfare changes per dollar of revenue, resulting from changes to the income thresholds of $1000 used in the income tax schedule, again using values of  of 08 and 04 for the adult equivalence scale parameter (along with  = 06). The lowest threshold,  1 = 0, as there is no tax-free range, and marginal changes are not considered in this case.
Welfare Effects per Dollar of Revenue Change
In the case of threshold changes, it is necessary to look for the highest value of¯∆  ∆w hen thresholds are increased, since this involves welfare gains as some people are moved into a lower-rate bracket. When thresholds are reduced, this involves welfare losses as some people are moved into a higher-rate tax bracket, so it is necessary to look for the lowest value of¯∆
Using money metric utility (shown in the top half of the table), when  = 08, the low  = 01 implies raising  4 and reducing  2 . For  = 02 and higher, the optimal policy is to raise  2 and reduce  4 . These outcomes are unchanged for the higher extent of economies of scale,  = 04. Higher inequality aversion therefore implies moving more people into the top-rate bracket, and more people into the bottom tax bracket. Only the lower aversion parameter of 0.1 implies moving some people out of the top tax bracket. 20 
Money Metric Utility Scale parameter:  = 08  2 When net income is used as the welfare metric, the implications again differ compared with the use of money metric utility. For the higher inequality aversions of 0.8 and 1.4, and  = 08, the smallest welfare loss per dollar of revenue arises from reducing the top income threshold,  4 , while the biggest gain arises from raising the threshold  2 . For  = 01 and 02 the smallest loss is from reducing  2 , while the biggest gain is also from raising  2 This means, as with the use of net income when considering marginal rate changes, that it is necessary to examine the largest net gain from all combinations of threshold increases and reductions. In the case of  = 01, the only combination which gives a positive net gain is for raising  4 while also lowering  2 . For  = 02, the only combination giving a positive net gain involves raising  2 combined with lowering  4 : this corresponds to the policy arising from the higher inequality aversion parameters. Table 10 reports the inequality changes as the thresholds are changed. The top half refers to money metric utility while the lower half reports results for net income. In each case, the values of inequality change are, unsurprisingly, very small due to the small change of $1,000 in each threshold simulated. Also, comparable to the case of the tax rate reform simulations described above, changes in the lower threshold,  2 , are similar whether net income or money metric utility is used (especially at lower values of ), while changes in higher thresholds,  3 and  4 , are relatively larger when based on net incomes. For example, increasing  3 by $1,000 increases the Atkinson index by 0296 (0180) per cent for  = 01 (02), and  = 08, based on net incomes, but by only 0045 (0036) based on money metric utility. 
Money Metric Utility Scale parameter:  = 08 
Rate and Threshold Changes Combined
Using the information provided in Tables 5 and 9 , it is possible to extract combinations of rate and threshold changes that give rise to the largest welfare gains per dollar of revenue (for rate reductions and threshold increases) and the smallest welfare losses (for rate increases and threshold reductions). These are shown in Table 11 for the case where  = 08. Hence, for the lower inequality aversion of  = 01, the biggest gain arises from raising the income threshold,  4 , and combining this with the smallest loss, obtained by raising the top marginal rate,  4 . This means that some people would be moved out of the top tax bracket into a lower-tax bracket, while those remaining in the top bracket would face a higher rate. By contrast, for higher inequality aversion of  = 02, the biggest welfare improvement arises from combining a rise in the threshold,  2 , (giving the biggest gain) with a rise in the top rate,  4 (giving the smallest loss). Inequality aversion therefore influences the choice of group to be shifted to a lower-tax bracket.
Conclusions
This paper began by questioning whether optimal marginal changes to the structure of the income tax in New Zealand might involve increased tax rate progression, with a higher top marginal rate, or a flattening of the rate structure as suggested by results for Australia. The paper examined welfare-improving reforms using a behavioural tax microsimulation model and a range of assumptions concerning the social welfare, or evaluation, function. In looking for practical advice regarding marginal adjustments to tax parameters, behavioural microsimulation can provide the kind of detail needed, and captures the considerable complexity of actual tax-transfer systems and the large degree of population heterogeneity found in practice.
Welfare changes per dollar of revenue were obtained using additive Paretian welfare functions displaying constant relative inequality aversion. Two alternative welfare metrics were used in the social welfare function. One, for 'welfarist' functions, involves the use of money metric utility per adult equivalent person. The 'non-welfarist' alternative of net income, commonly used for tax policy advice in practice, was also investigated and compared.
It was found that, for a wide range of inequality aversion parameters used for the welfare function, and for different scale economies in adult equivalence parameters, optimal marginal reforms involved increasing the top rate of income tax, and reducing lower rates. It was shown how to combine these changes in a revenue neutral way. Additionally, larger welfare improvements were obtained when changes in income tax rates and thresholds are combined. The model also produced estimates of the behavioural component of revenue changes associated with the reforms simulated. In aggregate, these were shown to vary from around five to fourteen per cent of the mechanical revenue effects of reform, and with substantially larger variation across household types.
Identifying the optimal direction of reform as involving an increase in the degree of marginal rate progression contrasts with results from a similar microsimulation exercise for Australia. However, with a top marginal rate in New Zealand much lower than in Australia, these results may be consistent with optimal directions for reform in each country. Further, results for both countries were obtained from models in which labour supply adjustments are the only behavioural responses. Drawing on the literature on the elasticity of taxable income, which accounts for additional income responses such as tax evasion or avoidance and bargaining over salaries, it was found that these additional responses would have to be particularly large in this case to qualitatively alter results for the top marginal rate.
Finally, making welfare comparisons based on money metric utility rather than net income was shown to be potentially important for policy reform conclusions. For example, the inequality impacts of tax rate changes can appear to be much larger when net income rather than utility is used, highlighting the importance of recognising and calibrating the social welfare impact of changes in leisure time in the evaluation of alternative tax or transfer reforms. For couples, the female hours distribution therefore covers a wider range of part-time and full-time hours than the male distribution.
In calculating net incomes, Taxwell-A assumes a take-up rate for welfare benefits and tax credits of 100 per cent, for both tax systems examined. This may lead to some overestimation of expenditure on the different payments in both pre-and post-reform. The simulated changes reported here are not expected to be biased as the policy changes did not expand eligibility to a large extent. All persons for whom labour supply is modelled, except sole parents, are potentially eligible for Unemployment Benefits. Sole parents are eligible for Domestic Purpose Benefit. The income-test rules are then applied to calculate actual benefit levels. The simulations presented below are based on the tax and transfer structure of New Zealand for the year 2008.
A policy simulation involves comparing the observed hours level of each individual in the base HES sample, facing the pre-reform tax and transfer structure, with the (conditional) expected value of hours for the individual obtained after the reform is imposed. It is important to ensure that the observed hours in the pre-reform case can be regarded as an optimal position for each individual. Hence, a 'calibration' process is used to select a large number of sets of random draws from the distribution of the stochastic component of utility which are used for post-reform computations. Briefly, this process is as follows, and for a detailed introduction to discrete hours modelling and the calibration approach in microsimulation, see Creedy and Kalb (2005) .
The behavioural simulation procedure for each individual or couple begins by converting the observed working hours to the closest discrete level. Then, given the parameter estimates of the preference functions (which allow for observed heterogeneity), the deterministic components of utility for each hours level are calculated for the net incomes generated by the pre-reform tax and transfer system. A set of random draws, one for each discrete hours level, is then taken from the Type-I extreme value distribution. For each hours level, the total value of utility is determined by adding a random draw to the deterministic component of utility. The hours level giving maximum total utility can then be obtained for that set of random draws. The sets for which observed hours are equal to optimum hours in the prereform situation are retained and used to determine the conditional distribution of optimal hours levels after the reform for each individual. To obtain sufficient information regarding the post-reform hours distribution over the discrete hours levels for each individual, 100 such sets of draws are used in the simulations. The calibration approach also ensures that the results before the reform are comparable between TaxWell-A and TaxWell-B.
For the post-reform analysis, the new net incomes cause the deterministic component of utility at each hours level to change. Using the 100 sets of draws retained for each individual from the calibration procedure, a distribution of optimal hours of work is determined. This is essentially a conditional probability distribution over the set of discrete hours for each individual under the post-reform policy. Post-reform labour supply is obtained as the expected value of hours of labour supply after the change, conditional on starting from the observed hours before the change.
In some cases, the required number of successful random draws producing pre-reform observed hours as the optimal hours cannot be generated within the designated number of drawings. Under such circumstances, the individual's labour supply is held fixed at their observed hours. However, this problem arises for very few individuals in the sample.
Appendix B: Aggregate Effects: Reductions in Rates and Thresholds 
